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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,
v.
MARK STEPHEN MERILA,

Case No. 970107-CA
Priority No. 2

Defendant/Appellant,
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
This appeal is from a final judgment and conviction for
absconding, a third degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann.
§ 76-8-309.5(2) (Supp. 1997) (a copy of the judgment is attached
hereto as Addendum A ) , in the Third Judicial District Court, Salt
Lake Department, Division I in and for Salt Lake County, State of
Utah, the Honorable J. Dennis Frederick, presiding. Jurisdiction
is conferred on this Court pursuant to Utah R. Crim. P. 26(2)(a)
(1997) and Utah Code Ann.

§ 78-2a-3(2) (e) (1996) .

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
The issues presented for review are as follows:
1.

Whether the trial court erred in ruling that the state

presented legally sufficient evidence to establish that Appellant
Mark Merila ("Merila") willfully changed his residence in
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-309.5(2) (Supp. 1997).
Standard of Review:

The first issue concerns statutory

construction, which is reviewed for correctness, State v.
Thurman, 911 P.2d 371, 372 (Utah 1996), and the sufficiency of
the evidence, which is reviewed as follows:
We reverse the jury's verdict in a criminal case when we
conclude as a matter of law that the evidence was

insufficient to warrant conviction. State v. Harman, 767
P.2d 567, 568 (Utah App. 1989). Nevertheless, "the standard
for reversal is high." Id. We will reverse only if the
evidence is so "'inconclusive or inherently improbable that
reasonable minds must have entertained a reasonable doubt
that the defendant committed the crime.'" Id. (quoting State
v. Petree, 659 P.2d 443, 444 (Utah 1983)); accord State v.
Bradley, 752 P.2d 874, 876 (Utah 1985). We review from a
perspective most favorable to the verdict the evidence and
all inferences reasonably drawn from the evidence, recognizing that determinations regarding witness credibility are
solely within the jury's province. Harman, 767 P.2d at 568.
State v. Smith, 927 P.2d 649, 651 (Utah App. 1996).
2.

Whether it was error for the trial court to admit

testimony concerning "flight" into evidence, and/or whether the
trial court erred in failing to give limiting instructions in
connection with the state's use of such evidence.
Standard of Review:

The second issue is two-fold.

First,

the trial court has broad discretion in determining the relevance
of evidence; the appellate court will find error only if the
trial court has abused its discretion.

See State v. Harrison,

805 P.2d 769, 780 (Utah App.), cert, denied, 817 P.2d 327 (Utah
1991). Second, the propriety of a jury instruction presents a
question of law which this Court reviews non-deferentially for
correctness. State v. Brooks, 833 P.2d 362, 363 (Utah App. 1992);
see also Salt Lake City v. Smoot, 921 P.2d 1003, 1006 (Utah
App.), cert, denied, 925 P.2d 963 (Utah 1996).
3. Whether the prosecutor committed prejudicial misconduct
in closing argument.
Standard of Review:

In assessing the prosecutor's state-

ments, this Court will make an original determination of whether
the prosecutor brought improper information to the jurors'
2

attention, and whether such information probably influenced the
jurors.

State v. Troy. 688 P.2d 4 8 3 , 486 (Utah 1 9 8 4 ) .

If this

Court views the evidence of guilt to be ambiguous or in conflict
with other evidence, this Court will "more closely scrutinize the
conduct."

Id

When objections are not made at trial, appellate

review is under a "plain error" standard.

State v. Palmer, 860

P.2d 339, 342 (Utah A p p . ) , cert, denied, 868 P.2d 95 (Utah 1 9 9 3 ) .
4.

Whether trial counsel

rendered eonstituti- Tally

deficient assistance.
Standard of review:

This Court reviews the record and

determines as a matter of law whether procedural error occurred
and further, whether the error affected defendant's substantial
rights.

State v. Ellifritz, 835 P.2d 170 # 174 (Utah A p p . 1 9 9 2 ) .
PRESERVATION OF ARGUMENT

Merila's first issue concerning sufficiency of the evidence
was preserved in the Record
to the second

("R,") at 128: 6 4 , 74-75. W i t h regard

i.abue concerning "flight, " counsel for Merila

objected to such evidence on the basis that
(R. 128: 50.)
counsel did :

W i t h respect to the third issue, Merila's trial
object

during closing argument.

» ^*.cial comments

r

The issue was not preserved but m a y be

reviewed under the plain error doctrine.
34z .

:. was irrelevant.

Palmer, 860 P.2d at

"I. "he fourth issue r e q u i r e s i I o p r e s e r v a t i o n ; :i t: :i s r e v i e w e d

on direct appeal where the record is adequate.

See State v.

Garrett, 849 P.2d 578, 580 & n. 3 (Utah A p p . 1 9 9 3 ) .

3

RULES, STATUTES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS
The following rules, statutes and constitutional provisions
will be determinative of the issues on appeal:
Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-309.5(2) (Supp. 1997).
Utah Const. Art. I, § 2.
Utah Const. Art. I, § 7.
Utah Const. Art. I, § 1 2 .
U.S. Const, amend. VI.
U.S. Const, amend. XIV.
The text of those provisions is contained in the attached
Addendum B.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case, Course of Proceedings and
Disposition in the Court Below.
In July 1996, Merila was charged by Information with
absconding, a third degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann.
§ 76-8-309.5(2) (Supp. 1997). x
a jury.

(R. 41-42.)

(R. 4-5.)

The case was tried to

At the close of the state's case, counsel

for Merila moved for a dismissal of the charge on the basis that
the state failed to present evidence sufficient to establish a

1

The absconding statute was first enacted in April 1996. An
amendment went into effect in May 1997 concerning subsection (1),
which was not charged in Merila's case. Subsection (1) currently
provides that an offender absconds from a parolee residential
facility that is owned operated, leased, or contracted by the
government when he " (a) leaves the facility without permission; or
(b) fails to return [to such facility] at a prescribed time." The
May 1997 amendment added subsection (1)(b) to the statute.
4

v i o l a t i o n of the s t a t u t e .
denied Merila's motion.

(R. 1 2 8 : 6 4 , 74-75.)

The trial court

(Id.)

T h e r e a f t e r , the jury rendered a verdict of g u i l t y against
Merila.

(R. 4 2 ; 68.)

The trial court sentenced him to serve a

sentence ilot to exceed five years for the a b s c o n d i n g o f f e n s e .
The trial court ordered such sentence to run c o n s e c u t i v e l y w i t h
the s e n t e n c e he c u r r e n t l y w o u l d be serving for the u n d e r l y i n g
offense(
absconded.
j udgment.

•:
(R. 69.)

ie was on p a r o l e at the time he a l l e g e d l y
M e r i l a is appealing from the final

(See R. 7 0; 7 7; 107.)
STATEMENT OF FACTS

M e r i l a w a s charged w i t h absconding, a third degree reiony in
v i o l a t i o n of U t a h Code Ann. § 76-8-309.5(2)

(Supp. 19 9 7 ) , in that

o n c • :i : a b o u t J I I i i e 3 , ] 9 9 6 , 1 I e a ] ] e g e d 1 y w i I ] f u ] 1 y c h a n g e d h i s
r e s i d e n c e w h i l e o n p a r o l e w i t h o u t n o t i f y i n g his p a r o l e o f f i c e r o r
obtaining permission.

(R. 4-5.)

D u r i n g the trial the state

p r e s e n t e d test d m o n y from f oi ii : i witnesses .

Tl: ie fir st w:i t n e s s ,

agent Paul T r u e l s o n , testified that he was r e s p o n s i b l e for
s u p e r v i s i n g M e r i l a ' s p a r o l e in June 1996.

(R. 128; 28-29.)

A c c o r d i n g t o T r u e 1 s c i l, I I e r :i 1 a w a s a "'"' j: 1 i a s e t: w; : •," • : • f f e n d e r,
w h i c h m e a n t he w a s o n a less restrictive p a r o l e s u p e r v i s i o n .

D

1 2 8 : 30.) In a c c o r d a n c e w i t h the c o n d i t i o n s of p a r o l e , M e r i l a w a s
required to "report twice monthly
curfew

[was] n i n e o'clock

Mi 11 I'u-1 f *.-i i ole office]

His

[in the e v e n i n g ] " and T r u e l s o n w a s re-

q u i r e d to v i s i t M e r i l a in the field twice a m o n t h , d

30.)

M e r i l a a l s o w a s i e q u i r e d t : • wear ai i ankle b r a c e l e t . (

: 31.)

5

Truelson testified that if a person wearing such a bracelet
failed to check in at home by the designated curfew hour,
electronic monitoring equipment at the house would notify an
agent.

"[The monitoring equipment then would] indicate when he

[came] back into the home because the unit [could] read the ankle
bracelet."

(R. 128: 31.)

According to the testimony, on June 3, 1996, electronic
monitoring equipment in Merila's West Valley City home indicated
that Merila failed to check in at the time designated as his
curfew.

(R. 128: 32.)

On June 4, 1996, the equipment indicated

that Merila came home at 5:00 a.m. (R. 128: 32.)

Merila called

Truelson that morning at 7:17 and left a message that he would be
looking for a job that day.

(R. 128: 38-39.)

Truelson called

Merila back at 7:45 a.m. but received no answer.

(R. 128: 38.)

Truelson testified that on June 5th at 10:30 p.m., he went
to the residence and observed that Merila was not home at that
time.

(R. 128: 33, 38.)

He also observed that the company in

charge of the monitoring equipment had removed all equipment from
the premises based on an indication that either the ankle bracelet had been removed, or electrical problems in the West Valley
City area had damaged the equipment. (R. 12 8: 33, 36, 37, 3 9.)
Once the box was removed, there was no way of determining
from electronic surveillance whether Merila was out past curfew.
(R. 128: 36.)

Truelson testified that he believed the electronic

monitoring agents "would have" replaced the equipment; however,
nothing in the record supports the determination that the
6

equipment was replaced since agents made no further visits to
Merila's home.

(R.,t 128: 37, 39. ) 2

When Truelson went to the home on June 5th he met w.;:..
Merila's fiance, Jodean Johnson,

(R. 128: 34.) Johnson lived at

the West Valleyr Ci ty address and confirmed that as of that date,
Merila still lived at the residence. (R. 128; 34, 66-70.)
Truelson searched the home and determined that in fact Merila's
belongings were ther>

I'P 128: 34. ~-;1

"hereaf ter, Truelson

made no further attempt to contact Merila at his home, or to
determine his whereabouts.
sent a letter !::c Johnson < -

(R. 128: 34, 3 9.)
:

-

violation of his parole

Rather, Truelson

v

' • stati i lg Merila w^- '..n
35; State's Exhibit 3.)

The state presented no additional evidence concerning

2

Truelson's first recollection was that the equipment was
removed because Merila tampered with the ankle bracelet. (R. 128:
33, 36, 37, 39.)
If the jury relied on Truelson's first
recollection and if the jury determined the electronic equipment
was "replaced" as indicated by Truelson, the agency would be
required to provide Merila with another bracelet in order that the
equipment would function properly. Thus, if the equipment was
replaced and Merila was provided with another bracelet, the facts
concerning the equipment support the determination that between
June 5 and June 24, Merila reported home in a timely manner every
evening. There is no indication that electronic monitoring
equipment notified a parole agent that Merila stayed out past
curfew after June 5th.
On the other hand, if the equipment was not replaced or if the
agency failed to provide Merila with an ankle bracelet, because
Truelson did not visit Merila at any other time that month, there
would be no way for Truelson to know from the equipment whether
Merila reported home each evening prior to curfew.
Either way, Truelson's testimony concerning the electronic
monitoring equipment does not support the determination that Merila
changed his residence.
It simply reflects that Truelson had no
information from electronic surveillance that Merila violated
curfew after June 5th. The lack of evidence cannot support the
conclusion that on or about June 3rd, Merila changed his residence.
7

Merila's alleged change of residence. Rather, the state's second
witness, agent Harvey Vankatwyk, testified that he was aware that
Merila lived with Johnson. (R. 128: 44.)

Between June 4th and

June 24th Vankatwyk spoke with Johnson and confirmed that Merila
was living at the West Valley residence.

Johnson also indicated

to Vankatwyk that on occasion Merila arrived home late.

(R. 128:

45-46, 66-67, 70-71, 72-73.)
Vankatwyk also testified that on or about June 24, 1996, he
received a tip from Johnson's mother that Merila would be picking
up Johnson from work that day. (R. 128: 40-41.)

Agents went to

Johnson's place of employment on 9th West in Salt Lake City and
waited for Merila.

(R. 128: 42, 50-51, 60.)

When they observed

Merila pull onto 9th West at approximately 5:00 p.m. in Johnson's
car, they followed him.

(R. 128: 42-43, 50-51.)

According to the evidence, the pursuit lead agents south on
9th West to a Flying J restaurant, then north on 9th West to
California Avenue where the pursuit continued on foot and into
the Jordan River. (R. 128: 43, 52-57, 60-62.) Agents apprehended
Merila.

(R. 128: 57, 62-63.)

As of that date, according to the

evidence, Merila was still residing with Johnson at the West
Valley City address.

The state's final witnesses testified only

with respect to the June 24th pursuit and arrest. (See R. 128:
48-64.)
During closing argument the prosecutor made several
statements that were not supported by the evidence, but were
meant to inflame the jury.

For example, while the evidence
8

reflected that Merila properly reported the West Valley address
as liis residence and continued to live there during the relevant
time period, the prosecutor stated, "it was not his house
originally, It was not a place that he had before; it was a place
thai: lie was1 staying while he was on parole, " suggesting either
that Merila failed from the outset to report his correct address
or he maintained a second residence. (R. 128: 88.)
Th^ prosHi 'iil-or also sta* - *: !" iat if Adult Probation and
Parole had gone out at almost any reasonable hour [during the
relevant time period] looking for [Merila at the West Valley City
address],

I.

been there."

because he wouldn't have

(R. 128: or-

c:,... ;, a statement went beyond the

evidence and misrepresented -.vie testimony.
.--• .*\r s case

At: 11 le conelus io . "

f Iei: :i ] a asked the

court to dismiss the matter since the state had failed in its
burden to present any evidence that Merila had changed his residence.

i'P, 128; i\4 , 'J '"> J

""r- ~ . .

and the jury rendered a guilty verdict

* -e
. *

t:ion

*-~b, v

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
Utah' s absconding statute j: a: ovides tl iat i f a p »a i olee
willfully changes his residence without notifying his parole
officer i
f e 1 ony.

obtaining permission, he is guilty of a third degree
I.

:i s c a s e, t1

- * 31 e c harged Me i : :i ] a wi t h abs condii lg

on or about June 3, 1996. : J: presented evidence that on or about:
the relevant time period, Merila continued to live at his
reported residence'. The state also present »-'ii evidence that during
9

that time period, Merila allegedly failed to report to his parole
officers and he failed on occasion to report to the residence by
his designated curfew hour.

The state's case arguably supports

the determination that on or about June 3rd, Merila was avoiding
parole supervision.

Such conduct arguably constitutes a

violation of the conditions of parole, but is insufficient to
support a conviction for the offense specifically set forth in
the absconding statute.

The state failed to present evidence

sufficient to support the conviction.
The state also presented evidence that three weeks after
Merila allegedly absconded, officers were informed that he would
be picking up Johnson from work.

According to the state's

witnesses, officers watched for Merila outside Johnson's place of
employment. When they observed Merila pull onto 9th West, they
followed him in the car, on foot, and through the Jordan River
where they apprehended him. The evidence of the pursuit or
"flight" in this case was irrelevant to the charged offense, provoked the jury's instinct to punish, was used for its prejudicial
effect, and was not accompanied by limiting, cautionary instructions as required by Utah law.

The evidence was irrelevant and

prejudicial. It was error for the trial court to admit testimony
of "flight" into evidence without limiting instructions.
During closing argument the prosecutor informed the jury
that if agents had gone to Merila's house at any reasonable hour
during the relevant time period, they would not have found him
there because he was not there.

The prosecutor's statements went
10

beyond the evidence and were improper under the plain error
doctrine, where case law and the professional rules of conduct
prohibit attorneys from alluding to matters not introduced in
evidence at trial.

In addition, the improper statements had a

prejudicial effect..

The trial court failed to admonish the jury

that arguments of counsel do not constitute evidence and that the
jury is to rely only on the evidence in reaching its verdict.
The proseci itor s remarks were improper.

Merila is entitled to a

new trial.
Finally, trial counsel for Merila failed to object to the
improper remarks at trial

failed to request limiting

instructions concerning the state's use of "flight" evidence.
Trial counsel's performance was deficient and prejudicial to the
outcome of the tri^l.

Meri 1 a was denied effecti ^ ^

---" stance of

counsel in violation of the state and federal constitutions.

He

is entitled to a new trial on that basis.
ARGUMENT
POINT I. THE STATE FAILED TO ESTABLISH THAT MERILA
"CHANGED" HIS "RESIDENCE" IN VIOLATION OF THE STATUTE.
A. THE WORDS "CHANGE" AND "RESIDENCE" MUST BE GIVEN THEIR
PLAIN AND ORDINARY MEANINGS.
In considering the sufficiency of the evidence, it is proper
to identify the elements that make up the offense at issue by
constr uirig tl le statute defining that offense

See State v. Dunn,

850 P.2d 1201, 1215 (Utah 1993) (in considering sufficiency of
the evidence, court construes elements of the offense of reckless
m a n s l a u g h t e r ) ; S t a t e v. Smith,

»:.!'.' I1 Jd M "" „ t.fjl
11

I Uf all App , i O Q 6)

("We begin our [sufficiency] review by setting out the elements
of the crime11); State v. Singh, 819 P.2d 356, 358-59 (Utah App.
1991); U.S. v. Cicco, 10 F.3d 980, 983 (10th Cir. 1993) (in
considering the sufficiency of the evidence, "[w]e will utilize
the traditional tools of statutory construction in order to
determine what conduct constitutes a violation of [the criminal
statute]"); U.S. v. Bailey, 36 F.3d 106, 109-10 (D.C. Cir. 1994),
conviction reversed, 116 S.Ct. 501 (1995); U.S. v. Hollis, 971
F.2d 1441, 1447-49 (10th Cir. 1992) (court considers meaning of
each element), cert, denied, 507 U.S. 985 (1993); U.S. v. Levine,
41 F.3d 607, 610-11 (10th Cir. 1994) (sufficiency of the evidence
analysis necessarily includes engaging in statutory construction
to determine elements of the offense).
To that end, this Court is "guided by the rule that a
statute should generally be construed according to its plain
language." Brinkerhoff v. Forsyth, 779 P.2d 685, 686 (Utah
1989) .3

The statute at issue in this case is Section 76-8-

3

The following cases support the long-standing rule in this
jurisdiction that when the Court is construing a statute, the Court
begins with the plain language of the statute. S .H. , ex rel.
Robinson v. Bistryski, 923 P.2d 1376 (Utah 1996) (court considered
the plain language of the comparative negligence statute to
determine whether it applied to the dog bite statute); Carlie v.
Morgan, 922 P. 2d 1, 3 (Utah 1996) (court looked to the plain
language of the Utah Relocation Assistance Act to determine the
scope of its application); Salt Lake Child and Family Therapy
Clinic, Inc. v. Frederick, 890 P.2d 1017, 1020 (Utah 1995) (in
determining whether statutory privilege was absolute or could be
waived, court looked to plain language of the statute); State v.
Farrow, 919 P.2d 50, 53-54 (Utah App. 1996) (court construed
warrantless arrest provision according to the plain language of the
statute); Kearns Tribune Corp. v. Hornak, 917 P. 2d 79, 82 (Utah
App. 1996) (court first considered plain language of statute, then
(continued...)
12

3 09.5, absconding, which provides in relevant part the following:
(1) An offender absconds from a facility when he:
(a) leaves the facility without permission; or
(b) fails to return at a prescribed time.
(2) An offender absconds from supervision when he
willfully changes the residence that he reported as his
correct address without notifying his parole officer or
obtaining permission.
(3) Absconding is a third degree felony.
Utah Code Ann

§ 76-8-309.5 (Supp. 1997); see note 1, supra.

According to the prosecutor, Merila is the first person to
be charged with violating Subsection (2) of the statute since its
enactmen

i April 1996

.)

define "residence" or "changes."

The statute does not

Consequently, this Court must

give those words their "plain and ordinary meaning." See Salem
City ,

Farnsworth, 753 P,2c I 514, b^

"* -

988).

The dictionary lists the following common meanings for the
word "residence":
la: the act or fact of dwelling in a place for some time b:
the act or fact of living or regularly staying at or in some
place for the discharge of a duty or the enjoyment of a
benefit 2 a ( 1 ) : the place where one actually lives as
distinguished from his domicile or a place of temporary
sojourn
(2): domicile
Webster's Ninth New Collegiate Dictionary 1003 (1983).

An

instruction pr :>l: r:i cieci to t:l le ji lry in this case defined "residence"
as follows:
"Residence" is defined as the factual place of abode or
3

(. . . continued)!)
legislative history where the statute could be read to have more
than one meaning); Allred v. Utah State Retirement Bd., 914 P.2d
1172, 1175 (Utah App. 1996); BB & B Transp. v. Industrial Comm'n of
Utah, 893 P. 2d 611, 614 (Utah App. 1995); Mt. Olvmpus Waters, Inc.
v. Utah State Tax Comm'n, 877 P.2d 1271, 1273-74 (Utah App. 1994),
cert, denied, 890 P.2d 1034 (Utah 1994).
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living in a particular locality. Residence simply indicates
a person's actual place of abode, whether permanent or
temporary and is accompanied with the intention to remain.
(R. 58.)
A separate Utah statute defines "residence" as meaning "the
person's principal place of abode," see Utah Code Ann. § 32A-1105(41) (1994); and case law and statutory law provide that art.
XIII, § 2(8) of the Utah Constitution defines residential
property as that which is used for residential purposes as a
primary place of abode. See Dennis v. Summit County, 933 P.2d
387, 389 (Utah 1997) .
The term "changes" as used in the absconding statute should
also be given its "plain and ordinary meaning."

In the context

of Section 76-8-309.5(2), "changes" means to make an essential
difference amounting to a loss of the original; or to replace,
substitute, or exchange with another.

See Webster's Ninth New

Collegiate Dictionary 226 (1983); Black's Law Dictionary 210
(1979 5th ed.) ("change of domicile" means change of residence
and intention to remain).

Thus, willfully changing one's

residence means to replace the reported residence with another
residence where one actually lives with an intent to remain.
B. THE LEGISLATURE DID NOT INTEND THAT OTHER VIOLATIONS OF
THE CONDITIONS OF PAROLE WOULD CONSTITUTE A SEPARATE OFFENSE
UNDER THE ABSCONDING STATUTE.
In this matter, Merila's Parole Agreement defined absconding
as failing to comply with the following requirements:
A. Reporting: I will report as directed by the Department
of Corrections.
B. Residence: I will establish and reside at a residence
of record and will not chancre my residence without
first
14

obtaining

permission

from my parole

agent.

C. Leaving the State: I will not leave my state of
residence, even briefly, or any other state to which I am
released or transferred without prior written permission
from my parole agent.
(State's Exhibit 2 (emphasis added); R. 128: 29-30.)
Agreement is dated September 30, 1995.

The Parole

Section 76-8-309.5,

enacted in 1996, makes a violation of the highlighted portion of
the Agreement a third degree felony.

Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-

309.5 (2) and (3) .
The Utah Legislature has dealt with other parole violations
in the following respects: In dealing with general violations and
violations while on parole for specific offenses (i.e. sexual
abuse offenses, rape offenses, kidnapping offenses, and/or
offenses against children) Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-202 provides
that "any person who violates the terms of his parole, while
serving parole, shall at the discretion of the Board of Pardons
and Parole be recommitted to prison to serve the portion of the
balance of his term as determined by the Board of Pardons and
Parole, but not to exceed the maximum term."

Utah Code Ann. §

76-3-202(1), (2), (3) (Supp. 1997); see also Utah Code Ann. § 7727-11(1) (Supp. 1997) (violations of parole conditions may result
in revocation of parole). 4
In addition,
When any parolee without authority from the Board of Pardons
and Parole absents himself from the state or avoids or
evades parole supervision, the period of absence, avoidance,
4

In 1997, amendments went into effect for Sections 76-3-202
and 77-27-11. Those amendments are irrelevant for purposes of this
appeal.
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or evasion tolls the parole period.
Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-202(7).
The legislature also specifically expressed that "leaving"
or failing to timely return to a residential or treatment
facility owned, operated, leased or contracted by a governmental
entity for criminal offenders constitutes absconding.

Utah Code

Ann. § 76-8-309.5(1) and (4).
The statutory provision charged in Merila's case
specifically provides that if a parolee "changes [his] residence"
without permission, he has committed a separate offense. Utah
Code Ann. § 76-8-309.5(2).

Subsection (2) reflects the

legislature did not intend that generally avoiding parole
supervision or absence from the residence without more would
constitute an offense; the statute requires proof of specific
conduct. Likewise, mere curfew violations do not constitute a
separate offense under § 76-8-309.5(2).
If the legislature had intended § 76-8-309.5(2) to apply to
other specific violations of the conditions of parole (including
curfew violations, or absence from the residence without more),
or avoiding supervision in general, the legislature was capable
of expressing the offense in those terms. See Utah Code Ann. §
76-3-202 (general violations cause revocation of parole, and
"avoid[ing]" "supervision" causes tolling of parole period); Utah
Code Ann. § 77-27-11 (violations of parole conditions may result
in revocation of parole); Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-309.5(1) and (4)
("leaving" a government residential facility without permission
16

or nfail[ing] to return" to such facility by "a prescribed time"
constitutes absconding).
In identifying the offense at Section 76-8-309.5(2), the
fact that the legislature did not use certain language (i.e.
language used in parole statutes and/or in Subsection (1) of the
absconding offense) reflects that the legislature did not intend
that provision to apply unless the state was able to specifically
establish that defendant actually and physically changed his
residence and intended to remain at the new residence.
In construing the plain language of a statute, this Court is
required to avoid potential constitutional conflicts.

See State

v. Strombercr, 783 P.2d 54, 58 (Utah App. 1989); State v. Casarez,
656 P.2d 1005, 1008 (Utah 1982).

If Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-

309.5(2) is interpreted to apply to evasions of supervision in
general, and/or to penalize specific parole violations other than
an unauthorized change of residence, the statute is in violation
of the due process provisions of the state and federal
constitutions.

U.S. Const, amend. XIV; Utah Const, art. I, § 7.

Vague laws offend several important values. First, because
we assume that man is free to steer between lawful and
unlawful conduct, we insist that laws give the person of
ordinary intelligence a reasonable opportunity to know what
is prohibited, so that he may act accordingly. Vague laws
may trap the innocent by not providing fair warning.
Second, if arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement is to be
prevented, laws must provide explicit standards for those
who apply them.
A vague law impermissibly delegates basic
policy matters to policemen, judges, and juries for
resolution on an ad hoc and subjective basis, with the
attendant dangers of arbitrary and discriminatory
application.
Gravned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108-09 (1972)
%1

(footnotes omitted); see also Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352,
357 (1983); Greenwood v. City of North Salt Lake, 817 P.2d 816,
819 (Utah 1991). "No one may be required at peril of life,
liberty or property to speculate as to the meaning of penal
statutes. All are entitled to be informed as to what the State
commands or forbids." Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 306 U.S. 451
(1939) ; see also State v. Shondel, 453 P.2d 146, 148 (Utah 1969) .
To avoid constitutional conflicts, this Court must interpret
§ 76-8-309.5(2) to require the state to prove that a parolee
"changed" his "residence" in order to support a conviction for
the separate offense. That is, the state is required to establish
that defendant willfully replaced, substituted, or exchanged the
reported residence with another residence where he actually lived
with an intent to remain for an undetermined period.
C. THE MARSHALLED EVIDENCE FAILS TO SUPPORT THE
DETERMINATION THAT MERILA "CHANGED" HIS "RESIDENCE."
This case concerns Merila's conduct as of June 3, 1996. (R.
4 (Information alleged that "on or about June 3, 1996," Merila
willfully changed his residence without notifying his parole
officer or obtaining permission).)

The evidence reflects that on

that date Merila allegedly violated curfew.
to the residence before 9:00 in the evening.

He failed to report
(R. 128: 32.)

On June 4th, agent Truelson received a telephone call from
Merila.

Thereafter, Truelson went to the residence, spoke with

Merila's finance, and confirmed with a personal inspection of the
house that as of June 5th, Merila still lived at the address and
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his belongings were there. Agents made no further inspection of
the home after that date. The evidence fails to support that
Merila had changed his address on or about June 3rd, or that he
intended or was expected to leave his fiance and/or move out.
In addition, Vankatwyk testified that he was informed
between June 4th and June 24th, that Merila continued to live at
the address; he was told that on occasion Merila arrived home
late at night.

Merila's conduct arguably may be construed as

evading supervision, which would cause the tolling of his parole
period and constitute a violation of the Parole Agreement without
giving rise to a separate offense. Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-202(7).
Without more, Merila's conduct does not constitute a violation of
the specific language of Section 76-8-309.5(2).
The fact that Merila may not have been home when agents
called twice or checked on him on one occasion after June 3rd, or
that he arrived home on occasion late at night, does not support
the determination that Merila willfully replaced or substituted
the reported residence with another residence where he actually
lived with an intent to remain for an undetermined period.

Like-

wise, the evidence fails to support a reasonable inference to
that effect.

Merila's conduct does not give rise to willfully

changing his address in violation of Section 76-8-309.5(2).

The

trial court erred in failing to dismiss the case where the state
presented insufficient evidence to support a conviction.
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POINT II • EVIDENCE OF PURSUIT OR "FLIGHT" IN THE CONTEXT OF
THIS CASE WAS MORE PREJUDICIAL THAN PROBATIVE; WHERE THE
TRIAL COURT ALLOWED THE EVIDENCE, IT WAS REQUIRED TO PROVIDE
THE JURY WITH LIMITING INSTRUCTIONS,
A.

EVIDENCE OF PURSUIT OR "FLIGHT" WAS IRRELEVANT.

In its case in chief, 2 of the state's 4 witnesses testified
to pursuing Merila on June 24, 1996, in his car, on foot, and
through the Jordan River before apprehending him for allegedly
"willfully chang[ing] his residence" on or about June 3, 1996.
(See R. 4-5; 128: 48-57, 59-63.)
Witness Charles Adler first testified in detail to pursuing
Merila. (R. 128:48-57.)5

After Adler began describing

surveillance at Johnson's place of employment on June 24th, and
as he began to testify to the pursuit, counsel for Merila
objected as follows:
[WITNESS ADLER]:
business.
[PROSECUTOR]:

We saw Ms. Johnson come out of the

And after she came out --

[COUNSEL FOR MERILA]: Your Honor, if I may, I'm not
sure what the relevance of this testimony is with
respect to the charges before the Court. He's charged
with absconding by changing his residence. I'm not
sure where this is going in terms of relevance.

5

Vankatwyk also provided testimony concerning the pursuit.
He testified that agents followed Merila to the Flying J
restaurant, agent Shannon Miller ordered Merila from his car,
Merila drove out of the restaurant parking lot, and Vankatwyk and
Miller attempted to pursue him. Vankatwyk also testified that he
arrived at the Jordan River as agents apprehended Merila. (R. 128:
43, 46-47.) Merila's counsel did not object to the admissibility of
testimony from Vankatwyk concerning "flight." Merila maintains
counsel was ineffective for failing to object to the admissibility
of that evidence. See Points II.A. and D., and IV, infra.
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THE COURT: Do you wish to respond?
[PROSECUTOR]: Yes, your Honor.
the defendant's state of mind.
THE COURT:
(R. 128: 50.)

I think it relates to

Objection's overruled.

You may continue.

Adler then explained that as Johnson began walking

north on 9th West, he observed Merila driving Johnson's car on
9th West.

At that point the pursuit ensued.

The only facts Adler testified to that arguably related to
"defendant's state of mind" involved the pursuit.

The trial

court improperly admitted the testimony concerning pursuit or
"flight" into evidence.
While evidence of "flight" has been upheld as a relevant
circumstance to be considered with other facts as tending to show
a consciousness of guilt, see State v. Franklin, 735 P.2d 34, 39
(Utah 1987) ("We have previously ruled that evidence of flight is
probative"), early case law reflects that flight from one offense
is not relevant in establishing guilt for another crime.

See

State v. Crawford, 59 Utah 39, 201 P. 1030 (1921); State v.
Whitney, 254 P. 525, 527 (Idaho 1927.)

That is, where a

defendant may have a "guilty" conscience for more than one
reason, the fact that he fled from agents sometime later does not
indicate a guilty conscience with respect to the specific offense
for which defendant is being tried. Thus, the evidence is
irrelevant.
In Crawford, defendant was charged with burglary after
officers found stolen items in a room that defendant shared with
another. Crawford, 201 P. at 1030-32.
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He also faced a charge for

a separate robbery offense.

In an attempt to prove the burglary

charge the state introduced evidence of the items found in the
shared room. Defendant argued that the evidence failed to support
the jury's guilty verdict unless the state could present
something else to connect defendant with the offense.

The state

claimed evidence of defendant's flight from being apprehended a
week after the burglary indicated his guilty conscience, and
together with the stolen items supported the verdict. The Utah
Supreme Court disagreed and stated the following:
If defendant had not been charged with another offense, and
one more serious than the one for which he was tried and
convicted, there would be more force in the state's
contention. But the record discloses that at the very time
he made the attempt to escape he was charged with the crime
of robbery, the penalty for which may be imprisonment for
life. In such circumstances the authorities seem to hold
that no presumption of guilt arises as to the offense for
which the accused is being tried.
Id. at 1033.
The Utah Supreme Court further explained Crawford in
Franklin:
In Crawford, we reversed the defendant's conviction because
there was insufficient evidence to sustain the jury's
verdict. In the course of that opinion, we were critical of
allowing evidence of flight when it was the only evidence
connectinr a defendant with the commission of the offense.
59 Utah a; 45, 201 P. at 1033. That decision should not be
read as holding that such evidence is never admissible.
Franklin, 735 P.2d at 39.

Likewise, Franklin should not be read

as eroding the rationale of Crawford; where the state has failed
to establish a connection between "flight" and the specific
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offense at issue, "fight" is irrelevant.6
In State v. Bales, 675 P.2d 573, 575 (Utah 1983), the Utah
Supreme Court reiterated that "flight" evidence was relevant and
admissible where, as in

that

case,

"evidence of flight was undis-

puted and consisted of the defendants7 running from the scene of
the crime immediately after a police officer identified himself
and ordered them to stop."
the facts in Bales'

case

Id.

The Bales court distinguished

from cases "where the actual evidence of

flight was slight or contradictory as to its motive."
P.2d at 575.

Bales, 675

The court also acknowledged the United States

Supreme Court's reservations about admitting flight into
evidence. "We have consistently doubted the probative value in
criminal trials of evidence that the accused fled the scene of an
actual or supposed crime." Bales, 675 P.2d at 574 (citing Wong
Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 483 n.10 (1963)).

I

I
6

I

The defendant in Franklin was accused of possession of a
stolen vehicle in Kentucky and two murders in Utah. Franklin, 735
P.2d at 35. He also was a suspect in some robberies. Id. at 38.
During the murder trial, the prosecution introduced evidence of
"flight."
Defendant argued on appeal that he evaded officers
because of the robbery charges, and that evidence of flight should
not have been admitted in the murder trial. Id. at 38. The Utah
Supreme Court was not persuaded.
| The court recognized in Franklin that the state presented
evidence connecting "flight" to the murder offenses: "During the
trial, the prosecution called Detective Jesse Baker as a witness.
Detective Baker testified that he had interviewed defendant in
Florence, Kentucky, after defendant had been arrested there on
suspicion of possessing a stolen vehicle. Detective Baker said that
defendant appeared unperturbed by questions concerning the stolen
vehicle charge, but became emotional when he was questioned about
the Utah murders. During a break in the questioning, defendant
escaped through a window." Franklin, 735 P.2d at 35.
The state has presented no evidence in Merila's case
connecting the evidence of "flight" to the absconding offense.
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Here, the "flight" evidence lacked probative value.

Merila

did not flee "from the scene of the crime," the "flight" evidence
was not consistent with willfully absconding, and counsel for
Merila disputed its relevance at trial.
As in Crawford, the state in Merila's case failed to present
evidence that Merila committed the charged offense.

Its proof

arguably supported the determination that Merila merely violated
parole by avoiding supervision.

Thus, as in Crawford, if

evidence of "flight" tended to show a "guilty conscience,"
arguably it was for violating parole and not committing an
offense.
The evidence of flight on June 24th is disputed,
inconsistent and irrelevant where it does not consist of Merila
fleeing the scene of a crime. It has no bearing on whether Merila
intentionally/willfully changed his residence on or about June
3rd. Consistent with Franklin, Crawford, and Bales, "flight"
evidence in Merila's case should not have been allowed.
B. TO THE EXTENT THE "FLIGHT" EVIDENCE WAS RELEVANT, IT
SHOULD HAVE BEEN ACCOMPANIED BY LIMITING INSTRUCTIONS.
In considering "flight" evidence, courts in this
jurisdiction have recognized its prejudicial effect; a jury is
inclined to infer guilt from the fact of flight. See Bales, 675
P.2d at 575 (recognizing concern in federal jurisdictions with
admitting evidence of flight since it suggests guilt); Franklin,
735 P.2d at 38-39 (evidence of flight admissible where trial
judge provided cautionary instruction warning jury not to give
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too much weight to mere fact of flight without considering other
motives besides guilt that may have influenced defendant);
Crawford, 201 P. 1033 ("flight" evidence "was indicative of
guilt" and therefore improper). This Court recognized that Bales
and Franklin require the trial court to exercise caution, weighing all considerations, before admitted "flight" into evidence.
See Fisher v. Trapp, 748 P.2d 204, 205 n.l (Utah App.), cert,
denied, 765 P.2d 1278 (Utah 1988) (Under Franklin and Bales
evidence of flight "is circumspectly admitted").
To obviate the prejudicial impact of "flight" evidence Utah
appellate courts have allowed such evidence where the trial court
has provided specific, limiting jury instructions.
In Franklin, the Court held, in a murder prosecution, that
evidence of defendant's flight from custody was not
erroneously admitted where the trial judge gave a cautionary
instruction warning the jury not to give too much weight to
the mere fact of flight without carefully considering the
other motives, besides guilt, that may have influenced
defendant.
Fisher, 748 P.2d at 205 n. 1.

If evidence of flight is admitted,

it "must be accompanied by specific instructions."

Id.

In State v. Howland, 761 P.2d 579, 580 n.l (Utah App. 1988),
this Court recognized that with evidence of "flight," the trial
judge should advise the jury that "(1) there may be reasons for
flight fully consistent with innocence, and (2) even if
consciousness of guilt is inferred from flight it does not
necessarily reflect actual guilt of the crime charged." Id.
(citing Bales, 675 P.2d at 575); Fisher, 748 P.2d at 205 n.l
(Franklin and Bales require flight evidence to be accompanied by
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specific instructions.)
No such limiting instructions were provided to the jury in
this matter. Attached hereto as Addendum C is the complete jury
charge.

Without the instructions, the trial court erred in

admitting testimony concerning "flight."
C. FAILURE TO PROVIDE THE LIMITING INSTRUCTIONS TO THE JURY
CONSTITUTED PLAIN ERROR.
Pursuant to well-established Utah case law it is plainly
obvious that limiting and cautionary instructions must be
provided to the jury in connection with the admission of "flight"
evidence.

Although counsel for Merila did not request such

instructions, the trial court's failure to provide them
constituted plain error.
The plain error doctrine considers whether the trial court
failed to engage in conduct that was required under the law in
existence at the time of the act in question.
In general, to establish the existence of plain error and to
obtain appellate relief from an alleged error that was not
properly objected to, the appellant must show the following:
(i) An error exists; (ii) the error should have been
obvious to the trial court; and (iii) the error is harmful,
i.e., absent the error, there is a reasonable likelihood of
a more favorable outcome for the appellant, or phrased
differently, our confidence in the verdict is undermined."
See State v. Verde, 770 P.2d 116, 122 (Utah 1989); State v.
Bell, 770 P.2d 100, 105-06 (Utah 1988); State v. Knight,
734 P.2d 913, 919-20 (Utah 1987); State v. Fontana, 680
P.2d 1042, 1048 (Utah 1984); see also [State v. Eldredae,
773 P.2d 29, 35-36 (Utah 1989)]; cJL. Utah R.Evid. 103(d);
Utah R.Crim.P. 19(c). If any one of these requirements is
not met, plain error is not established. Cf. State v. Hamilton, 827 P.2d 232, 240 (Utah 1992); Verde, 770 P.2d at 123.
State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 1208-09 (Utah 1993).
The first requirement in Dunn is that an error exists.
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Merila maintains that factor has been met. This Court recognized
that Utah case law concerning evidence of flight provides the
following:
The Utah Supreme Court has, however, addressed the
admissibility of flight evidence in the criminal context.
State v. Franklin, 735 P.2d 34 (Utah 1987); State v. Bales,
675 P.2d 573 (Utah 1983); State v. Simpson, 120 Utah 596,
236 P.2d 1077 (1951). In Franklin, the Court held, in a
murder prosecution, that evidence of defendant's flight from
custody was not erroneously admitted where the trial judge
gave a cautionary instruction warning the jury not to give
too much weight to the mere fact of flight without carefully
considering the other motives, besides guilt, that may have
influenced defendant. In Bales, the Utah Supreme Court
stated that it was error to instruct the jury that flight
from the scene of a crime constitutes an implied admission
of guilt and that a flight instruction "will not be
completely free from criticism unless it advises the jury
that there may be reasons for flight fully consistent with
innocence and that even if consciousness of guilt is
inferred from flight it does not necessarily reflect actual
guilt of the crime charged." Bales, 675 P.2d at 575.
Under

the reasoning in these two cases, it appears that, at least
in criminal cases, evidence of flight
is
circumspectly
admitted and, if admitted, must be accompanied by
specific
instructions.

Fisher, 748 P.2d at 205 n.l (emphasis added); see also Howland,
761 P.2d at 580 n.l (instructions to jury advise that reasons for
flight consistent with innocence may exist and if consciousness
of guilt is inferred it does not necessarily reflect actual guilt
of the crime charged). 7

Where evidence of "flight" is admitted,

7

The court in Bales did not reject additional language in
the limiting instructions that provided the following:
The flight or attempted flight of a person immediately after
the commission of a crime or after he is accused of a crime
that has been committed, is not sufficient in itself to
establish his guilt, but is a fact which, if proven, may be
considered by you in the light of all other proven facts in
deciding the question of his guilt or innocence. The weight
to which such circumstance is entitled is a matter for the
jury to determine.
(continued...)
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the trial court is required to provide the jury with limiting
instructions. The jury was not provided with limiting instructions in this case.

See Addendum C, attached.

Error exists.

Second, the error should have been obvious so that "a trial
court can legitimately be said to have had a reasonable
opportunity to address and correct it, even in the absence of an
objection."

State v. Eldredcre, 773 P.2d 29, 36 (Utah 1989),

cert, denied, 493 U.S. 814 (1989).
In considering the plainness of an error, the Utah Supreme
Court has recognized that when express language in a rule or case
law makes a specific course of action obvious to the trial court,
failure to act consistent therewith constitutes plain error.
State v. Labrum, 925 P.2d 937, 940 (Utah 1996).
In Labrum, the language of a sentencing statute required the
trial court to enter findings and conclusions to support
application of the statute. Failure to enter such findings
constituted plain error.

Labrum, 925 P.2d at 940; see also

State v. Gibbons, 779 P.2d 1133, 1137 (Utah 1989) (trial court's
failure to set forth on the record aggravating and mitigating
factors pursuant to the requirements set forth in State v. Bell,
754 P.2d 55 (Utah 1988), constituted plain error).
In Merila's case, at the time the trial court ruled that the
"flight" evidence was admissible, Utah law plainly provided that
admissibility of such evidence hinged on the submission to the
7

(...continued)
Bales, 675 P. 2d at 574. Utah courts have not mandated the provision
of the additional language in connection with evidence of "flight."
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jury of the limiting instructions.

See Point II.B., supra;

Franklin, 735 P.2d at 38-39; Fisher, 748 P.2d at 205 n.l.
The trial court in Merila's case had a reasonable
opportunity to address the matter when counsel for Merila
objected to the "flight" evidence in the first place.

In consi-

dering the effect of admitting "flight" into evidence, the trial
court likewise should have determined that case law concerning
such evidence focused on limiting instructions.

See Point II.B.

However, without regard for the cautionary language in case law,
and the mandate that "flight" evidence be accompanied by limiting
instructions, no such instructions were given. In accordance with
the second factor set forth in Dunn, and pursuant to Labrum, the
trial court's failure to provide limiting instructions as
dictated by case law constituted plain error.
The third requirement in Dunn also exists here. As set forth
below, Point II.D., infra, the prejudicial effects of "flight"
evidence should have been obvious to the trial judge.
Merila maintains the error in this case is fully reflected
in the record. The state elicited testimony from at least 2 witnesses concerning "flight"; Merila's counsel raised relevancy
concerns to the admissibility of such evidence enabling the trial
court to reflect on its reasons for allowing it; Utah courts
allow flight evidence when instructions limit the jury's use of
the evidence; Utah case law requires the use of limiting instructions; the trial court specifically admitted testimony of flight
without providing such instructions. Without limiting
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instructions, the evidence was prejudicial (see Point II.D.).
Where this case involves the submission of instructions to
the jury, which is an issue that this Court reviews without
deference to the trial court, State v. Brooks, 833 P.2d 362, 36364 (Utah App. 1992), this Court is fully capable of resolving
this issue on appeal.

It is enough to know that in connection

with evidence of "flight," the trial court was legally required
to provide the limiting instructions and it failed to do so. The
case should be reversed and remanded for a new trial.
D. MERILA SUFFERED PREJUDICE WHERE THE TRIAL COURT ALLOWED
"FLIGHT" EVIDENCE, AND FAILED TO PROPERLY INSTRUCT THE JURY.
Allowing the "flight" evidence without properly instructing
the jury was prejudicial in this case where Merila's conduct was
consistent with innocence on the underlying offense. The evidence
arguably supported that Merila violated parole by avoiding supervision, which would cause a tolling of the running of his parole,
Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-202(7).

The violations are a breach of the

conditions of parole but do not give rise to the separate,
specific offense. See Point I.B., supra.
Because the state failed to establish a "change" of
"residence," a reasonable likelihood exists that the jury would
have reached a different result if the trial court had excluded
evidence of "flight," or if the trial court had provided the jury
with limiting instructions concerning the use of "flight"
evidence. The evidence was admitted without the instructions.
The jury likely convicted Merila based on an inference from
the "flight" evidence that he appeared to have a "guilty"
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conscience.

A "guilty conscience" is insufficient to establish

the separate offense. Without the limiting instructions the jury
likely believed the "flight" evidence was a sufficient basis for
conviction.

The evidence should have been excluded.

In the alternative the trial court should have provided
limiting instructions to obviate the prejudicial impact of the
evidence.

The instructions would have advised jurors that

reasons for flight consistent with innocence on the underlying
offense may have existed, and "flight" did not necessarily
reflect actual guilt of the crime charged.
Because we cannot be sure that the jury did not convict
Merila on the basis of the "flight" evidence alone, the error is
prejudicial. Dunn, 850 P.2d at 1208-09; see also U.S. v.
McLernon, 746 F.2d 1098, 1120 (6th Cir. 1984) (record showed
prejudice where evidence to support offense was disputed
circumstantial evidence).

This Court should reverse and remand

this matter for a new trial.
POINT III. THE PROSECUTOR ENGAGED IN MISCONDUCT DURING
CLOSING ARGUMENT BY MAKING IMPROPER STATEMENTS.
During closing argument the prosecutor made remarks that
called the attention of the jurors to circumstances that were not
presented in evidence and that they were not justified in
considering in connection with a verdict.

Specifically, the

prosecutor stated "that if Adult Probation and Parole had gone
out at almost any reasonable hour [during the relevant time
period] looking for [Merila at the West Valley City address],
they wouldn't have found him because he wouldn't have been
31

there." (R. 128: 88.)
That statement was not supported by the evidence, but was
based in speculation. The evidence reflected that agents for
Adult Probation and Parole went to Merila's residence once on
June 5th and determined that he still lived there. In addition,
Vankatwyk spoke with Johnson once between June 4th and June 24th.
During the conversation, Vankatwyk was informed that Merila still
lived at the residence but on occasion arrived home late. (R.
128: 73.) The evidence does not support the prosecutor's remarks.
The Utah Supreme Court has established a two prong test for
reversals for improper statements of counsel:
The test of whether the remarks made by counsel are so
objectionable as to merit a reversal in a criminal case is,
did the remarks call to the attention of the jurors matters
which they would not be justified in considering in
determining their verdict, and were they, under the
circumstances of the particular case, probably influenced by
those remarks.
State v. Valdez, 513 P.2d 422, 426 (Utah 1973); accord State v.
Troy, 688 P.2d 483, 486 (Utah 1984); State v. Johnson, 663 P.2d
48 (Utah 1983), overruled on other grounds in State v. Roberts,
8

The prosecutor also improperly suggested that Merila failed
in the first instance to report his correct address. Specifically,
he stated: "it was not his house originally, it was not a place
that he had before; it was a place that he was staying while he was
on parole."
(R. 128: 88.)
Although the trial court instructed the jury that Merila was
charged with
"changing" his
"residence," the prosecutor's
statements suggested Merila violated the statute by failing to
properly report the address in the first place. The statements also
suggested that Merila may have had a second residence.
The inferences were not supported by the evidence. The danger
of the improper statements was heightened by the fact that the jury
was not provided with an instruction that counsel's statements do
not constitute evidence.
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711 P.2d 235, 239 (Utah 1985); State v. Creviston, 646 P.2d 750
(Utah 1982); State v. Gaxiola, 550 P.2d 1298 (Utah 1976).
If the conclusion of the jurors is based on their weighing
conflicting evidence or evidence susceptible of differing
interpretations, there is a greater likelihood that they
will be improperly influenced through remarks of counsel.
Indeed, in such cases, the jurors may be searching for
guidance in weighing and interpreting the evidence. They
may be especially susceptible to influence, and a small
degree of influence may be sufficient to affect the verdict.
State v. Trov, 688 P.2d 483, 486 (Utah 1984). As set forth below,
the remarks called to the attention of the jurors matters outside
the evidence; the jurors likely were influenced by those remarks.
A. THE PROSECUTOR DREW THE JURORS' ATTENTION TO MATTERS
THEY WERE NOT OTHERWISE JUSTIFIED IN CONSIDERING.
The prosecutor's improper comments drew the jurors'
attention to matters they were not justified in considering.

His

assertions mischaracterized and went beyond the actual evidence
presented, indicating that Merila was no longer at the residence.
The comments went to the heart of the case. "The insinuation that
other evidence exists encourages the jury to determine its
verdict based upon evidence outside the record and jeopardizes a
defendant's right to a trial based upon the evidence presented."
State v. Young, 853 P.2d 327, 349 (Utah 1993) (finding plain
error, but failing to find prejudice); see also State v. Pearson,
943 P.2d 1347 (Utah 1997).
In other contexts, the Utah appellate courts have reiterated
that it is error for a prosecutor to allude to the existence of
prejudicial facts where the prosecutor has failed to prove those
facts. State v. Emmett, 839 P.2d 781, 786-87 (Utah 1992); State
33

v. Palmer, 860 P.2d 339, 343 (Utah App. 1993) .

Since the

prosecutor in this case presented evidence that officers went to
Merila's residence on only one occasion, his statement that
Merila would not have been found at the address at almost any
reasonable hour was not supportable. The comments were improper.
B.

THE MISCONDUCT WAS PLAIN ERROR.

The Utah Supreme Court has identified the test for
establishing plain error as set forth in Point I I . C , supra.
Specifically, the appellant must show "(i) An error exists;
the error should have been obvious to the trial court;

(ii)

and (iii)

the error is harmful, i.e., absent the error, there is a reasonable likelihood of a more favorable outcome for the appellant, or
phrased differently, our confidence in the verdict is
undermined."

Dunn, 850 P.2d at 1208-09; Palmer, 860 P.2d at 342.

Considering the first and second factors in Dunn, the error
exists and should have been obvious to the trial court.

Case law

and the rules of professional conduct prohibit an attorney from
alluding to matters not introduced as evidence at trial. Young,
853 P.2d at 349; Utah Rules of Professional Conduct 3.4(e)(1997);
Palmer, 860 P.2d at 343.
The trial court in this matter heard Truelson and
Vankatwyk's testimony prior to closing argument.

The trial judge

should have known the prosecutor's remarks were not supported by
the evidence.

See Palmer, 860 P.2d at 343.

Since Truelson went

to Merila's residence on one occasion during the relevant time
period and Vankatwyk telephoned once, there was no basis for the
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prosecutor's statement that if agents had gone to the house at
almost any reasonable hour looking for Merila "they wouldn't have
found him because he wouldn't have been there."
Indeed, the converse of the prosecutor's statement rings
true: A reasonable hour for a person to be home is early morning.
If agents had gone out to the house at a "reasonable hour" they
would have found Merila there because he continued to live at the
West Valley address. When the prosecutor made his comment, the
trial court should have been alerted to the error.
The third factor in Dunn is also established.

As set forth

in Point I I I . C , infra, the prosecutor's improper statements were
harmful.

This Court may review the error on the merits where the

record is clear and the law disallowing such remarks in closing
argument is well-established.
C.

MERILA WAS PREJUDICED.

Where the proof of a defendant's guilt is strong, Utah
courts "will not presume the improper remark to be prejudicial.
But in a case with less than compelling proof, we will more
closely scrutinize the prosecutor's conduct."
Andreason, 718 P.2d 400, 402-03 (Utah 1986).

State v.
Where the state has

failed to present direct evidence of a particular fact that
becomes the subject of an improper remark in closing,
jurors are more likely influenced by an improper
argument. In such instances, they are more susceptible
to the suggestion that factors other than the evidence
before them should determine a defendant's guilt or
innocence. . . . In view of the highly marginal nature
of any evidence of criminal intent or knowledge on the
part of defendant, a reasonable likelihood exists that
in the absence of the prosecutor's prejudicial
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argument, there might have been a different result.
Id.
Likewise, if the jurors will be weighing conflicting
evidence or evidence susceptible of differing interpretations in
coming to a conclusion, there is a greater likelihood that they
will be improperly influenced through remarks of counsel. In such
cases, the jurors may be searching for guidance in weighing and
interpreting the evidence.

They may be especially susceptible to

influence, and a small degree of influence may be sufficient to
affect the verdict.

Counsel is obligated in such cases to avoid,

as far as possible, any reference to those matters the jury is
not justified in considering. Troy, 688 P.2d at 486-87.
As set forth herein, the state failed to offer any evidence,
let alone direct evidence, that Merila willfully changed his
residence.

The jurors considered conflicting evidence or

evidence susceptible of differing interpretations (i.e. the
evidence of "flight"). Thus, the prosecutor sought to supplement
the evidence with the improper remarks.

While the effect of such

remarks may be obviated by an instruction to the effect that
"arguments of counsel do not constitute evidence and that [jury
members] are to rely only on the evidence in reaching factual
conclusions," Pearson, 943 P.2d at 1353; Young, 853 P.2d at 349,
the trial court failed to provide the jury with such an
instruction in this case.

See Addendum C, hereto.

The effect of

the improper remarks was prejudicial.
Since (1) the remarks in Merila's case were based on
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speculation and matters not in evidence, and (2) the error was
substantial and prejudicial such that in their absence there was
a reasonable likelihood of a more favorable result for Merila,
the remarks compel the entry of an order reversing the judgment
and remanding the case for a new trial.

State v. Hopkins, 782

P.2d 475, 478 (Utah 1989).
POINT IV. MERILA'S TRIAL COUNSEL PROVIDED INEFFECTIVE
ASSISTANCE.
The sixth amendment and article I, section 12 of the Utah
Constitution guarantee criminal defendants the right to
assistance of counsel.

The right to counsel has been construed

to be "the right to effective assistance of counsel."

McMann v.

Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771 n. 14 (1970); accord State v.
McNicol, 554 P.2d 203, 204 (Utah 1976).

The Court in Strickland

v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), set forth the proper test for
determining whether counsel's performance was ineffective;
A convicted defendant's claim that counsel's assistance was
so defective as to require reversal of a conviction or death
sentence has two components. First, the defendant must show
that counsel's performance was deficient. This requires
showing that counsel made errors so serious that counsel was
not functioning as the "counsel" guaranteed the defendant by
the Sixth Amendment. Second, the defendant must show that
the deficient performance prejudiced the defense. This
requires showing that counsel's errors were so serious as to
deprive the defendant of a fair trial, a trial whose result
is reliable. Unless a defendant makes both showings, it
cannot be said that the conviction or death sentence
resulted from a breakdown in the adversary process that
renders the result unreliable.
Id. at 687; accord State v. Templin, 805 P.2d 182, 185 & n.5
(Utah 1990).

Merila's counsel's performance was deficient as set

forth herein.
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A. TRIAL COUNSEL WAS INEFFECTIVE IN THAT HE FAILED TO
REQUEST LIMITING INSTRUCTIONS IN CONNECTION WITH THE FLIGHT
EVIDENCE.
As set forth above, with respect to instructions limiting
the jury's use of "flight" evidence, this Court has recognized
that "evidence of flight is circumspectly admitted and, if
admitted, must be accompanied by specific instructions."

Fisher,

748 P.2d at 205 n.l. If this Court is not persuaded that the
language in Franklin, Bales, and Fisher compels the determination
that failure to provide the limiting instructions constituted
plain error, Merila maintains that in the context of this case,
trial counsel's failure to request such limiting instructions
constituted deficient performance and prejudiced Merila.
Utah case law reflects concern with admitting testimony
concerning flight into evidence unless the jury is advised that
11

(1) there may be reasons for flight fully consistent with

innocence, and (2) even if consciousness of guilt is inferred
from flight it does not necessarily reflect actual guilt of the
crime charged." Howland, 761 P.2d at 580 n.l.
In light of the trial court's ruling admitting "flight" into
evidence, the instructions should have been requested to remind
the jury that such testimony does not necessarily support the
determination that Merila was guilty of the underlying offense.
Since flight was a substantial portion of the state's case in
this matter and improperly suggested guilt, there was no possible
tactical reason for failing to request the instructions. "[W]here
a defendant can show that there was no conceivable legitimate
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tactical basis for counsel's deficient actions, the first prong
of Strickland is satisfied."

State v. Snyder, 860 P.2d 351, 359

(Utah App. 1993) (citing State v. Tennyson, 850 P.2d 461, 468
(Utah App. 1993)).
Merila has been prejudiced by trial counsel's failure to request the limiting instructions. First, he has been convicted
based on an improper use of prejudicial evidence where the jury
was not advised of the limiting use of the "flight" testimony.
See Point II.D., supra.

Such testimony should have been

considered with caution; the jury should have been given the
limiting instructions.

See Point II.B., supra.

Second, even if the trial court had improperly rejected such
limiting instructions, Merila would have properly preserved the
issue for review on the merits by this Court. Because trial
counsel failed to request the instructions, Merila has been
forced to argue plain error on appeal. See Point II.e., supra.
This Court can and should address the issue concerning the
limiting instructions on the merits to alleviate this prejudice.
Merila maintains that there is no conceivable tactical basis
for failing to request the limiting instructions.

The law is

clear and this Court is able to resolve the issues in Merila's
favor without further development of the record.
B. TRIAL COUNSEL WAS INEFFECTIVE IN THAT HE FAILED TO OBJECT
TO THE PROSECUTORS IMPROPER COMMENTS.
It should have been obvious to the trial court and counsel
that the prosecutor's closing statements misrepresented the
evidence.

No possible tactical reason existed for trial
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counsel's failure to object to the remarks, where they encouraged
the jury to consider matters outside the evidence.
Merila was prejudiced by trial counsel's failure to object
to the comments.

First, the comments improperly provided a basis

for the jury to convict Merila.

See Point I I I . C , supra.

Where

the state failed to present evidence to support the determination
that Merila willfully changed his residence, the prosecutor
supplemented the evidence with improper remarks.

See Point

III.A.; (R. 128: 88.)
Second, even if the trial court had improperly overruled an
objection, at the very least it could have offered a curative
instruction to the jury.

Utah courts repeatedly have ruled that

the effects of improper statements in closing argument are
ameliorated by curative instructions. See Young, 853 P.2d at 349;
Pearson, 943 P.2d at 1352-53 (curative instruction rendered
improper statements harmless).
In Pearson, the Utah Supreme Court ruled that although the
prosecutor made improper comments in front of the jury, the
comments were not likely to prejudice the outcome of the jury's
deliberations where the trial court instructed the jurors that
"arguments of counsel do not constitute evidence and that they
were to rely only on the evidence in reaching factual
conclusions."

Pearson, 943 P.2d at 1353. Such an instruction

would have been reasonable in this case.

Indeed it is commonly

provided to obviate the effects of statements that may be made
improperly by the prosection.

In this case, such an instruction
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was not provided.
Third, even if the trial court had improperly overruled an
objection to the prosecutor's remarks, Merila would have properly
preserved the issue for review on the merits by this Court.
Because trial counsel failed to object, Merila has been forced to
argue plain error on appeal.

See Point III.B., supra.

This

Court can and should address the merits of the issue concerning
the improper remarks to alleviate this prejudice.

Merila

maintains that there is no conceivable tactical basis for failing
to object to the prosecutor's improper statements.
CONCLUSION
Merila respectfully requests that with respect to the first
issue on appeal, this Court reverse the conviction on the basis
that the state failed to present sufficient evidence to establish
a violation of the absconding statute.

In the alternative, with

respect to the remaining issues, Merila is entitled to a new
trial since the trial court failed to provide the jury with
limiting instructions in connection with evidence concerning
"flight"; the prosecutor improperly alluded to facts not in
evidence constituting plain error; and trial counsel provided
ineffective assistance for failing to request the limiting
instructions and failing to object to the improper remarks.
SUBMITTED this 2Hi

day of

AJL^^UMJ^

, 1997,

[NDA M. JONES
LINDA
Attorney for Defen^Ant/Appellant
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ADDENDA

ADDENDUM A

IN T H E THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN A N D FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
THE STATE OF UTAH,
JUDGMENT, SENTENCE
(COMMITMENT)

Plaintiff,

Case No. .
Count No.

vs.

Honorable

Defendant.

)i.\qc>\noM S t
•

X

u

T^cV^

Clerk

(V, ^tf^gysg,

Reporter
Bailiff
Date

A . fogJTvCVP

YwAnrX?*^

9. Vdft<$
_3s2iD£S:

3^ ffll

to enter a judgment of conviction for the next lower category of offense and
D The motion of.
impose sentence accordingly is • granted D denied. There being no legal or other reason why sentence
should not be imposed, and defendant having been convicted b y ^ ( a jury; D the court; D plea of guilty;
D plea off np
np contest; of the offense of
AW^Q&^YA\V\QL^
, a felony
of the _ i z _ degree, D a class _
misdemeanor, being nowbresent in court and rready for sentence and
represented by J ^ L - S f i f i S S O ^ a n d the State being represents by ^ . F ^ p ^ i X , is now adjudged guilty
of the above offense, is now sentenced to a term in the Utah State Prison:
•
y^
D
D
•
D
D

to a maximum mandatory term of
years and which may be for life;
not to exceed five years;
of not less than one year nor more than fifteen years;
of not less than five years and which may be for life;
not to exceed
years;
and ordered to pay a fine in the amount of $
and ordered to pay restitution in the amount of $.
to

D such sentence is to run concurrently with
^
^
^
_
^ s u c h sentence is to run consecutively with
^ONL^ T3LPCCVS < ^ g f ^ ^ \ v i
^Q^\l\x
_\ate
D upon motion of D State, • Defense, • Court, Count(s)
*^-~ hereby
•
*~" (dismissed.
D Defendant is granted a stay of the above (D prison) sentence and placed on probation in the
custody of this Court and under the supervision of the Chief Agent, Utah State Department of Adult
Parole for the period of
, pursuant to the attached conditions of probation.
^ f Defendant is remanded into the custody of the Sheriff of Salt Lake County^(for delivery to the Utah State
Prison, Draper, Utah, or D for delivery to the Salt Lake County Jail, where defendant shall be confined
and imprisoned in accordance with this Judgment and Commitment.
^ Commitment shall issue " A t * r \ y \ u S ^ ^ , t
,
DATED this - | / - % y o f
APPROVED AS TO FORM:

Defense Counsel

Deputy County Attorney
(White—Court)

(Green—Judge)

Page
(Yellow—Jail/Pnson/AP4P)

(Pink—Defense)

(Goldenrod—State)
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ADDENDUM B

CRIMINAL CODE

76-8-309.5-

Absconding.

(1) An offender absconds from a facility when he:
(a) leaves the facility without permission; or
(b) fails to return at a prescribed time.
(2) An offender absconds from supervision when he willfully changes the
residence that he reported as his correct address without notifying his parole
officer or obtaining permission.
(3) Absconding is a third degree felony.
(4) For the purposes of this section:
(a) "Facility" means a residential facility owned, operated, leased, or
contracted by the Department of Corrections or a county to provide
housing, programming, or treatment of individuals who have been placed
on parole.
(b) "Offender" means a person who has been convicted of a crime and
has been:
(i) sent to a facility;
(ii) placed on parole under condition that he report to a parole
officer on a regular basis or that he serve periods of confinement
during his parole period or that he attend classes or treatment as a
condition of parole; or
(iii) released for a period during confinement for work, school,
treatment, or other temporary nonconfinement purposes.

Art. I

coNsnnrnoN

OF UTAH

Sec. 2. [All political power inherent in the people.]
All political power is inherent in the people; and all free governments are
founded on their authority for their equal protection and benefit, and they
have the right to alter or reform their government as the public welfare may
require.

Sec. 7. [Due process of law.]
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property, without due process
of law.

Sec. 12. [Rights of accused persons.]
In criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the right to appear and
defend in person and by counsel, to demand the nature and cause of the
accusation against him, to have a copy thereof, to testify in his own behalf, to
be confronted by the witnesses against him, to have compulsory process to
compel the attendance of witnesses in his own behalf, to have a speedy public
trial by an impartial jury of the county or district in which the offense is
alleged to have been committed, and the right to appeal in all cases. In no
instance shall any accused person, before final judgment, be compelled to
advance money or fees to secure the rights herein guaranteed. The accused
shall not be compelled to give evidence against himself; a wife shall not be
compelled to testify against her husband, nor a husband against his wife, nor
shall any person be twice put in jeopardy for the same offense.

CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES

AMENDMENT VI
[Rights of accused.]
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy
and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the
crime qfraH have been committed, which district shall have been previously
ascertained by law, and to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses against him; to have compulsory
process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the Assistance of
counsel for his defence.

AMENDMENT XTV
Section
1. [Citizenship — Due process of law — Equal
protection.]
2. [Representatives — Power to reduce appointment.]
3. [Disqualification to hold office.]

Section
4. [Public debt not to be questioned — Debts of
the Confederacy and claims not
to be paid.]
5. [Power to enforce amendment.]

Section 1. [Citizenship — Due process of law — Equal
protection.]
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the
jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein
they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the
privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor
deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.

Sec. 2.

[Representatives — Power to reduce appointment.]

Representatives shall be apportioned among the several States according to
their respective numbers, counting the whole number of persons in each
State, excluding Indians not taxed. But when the right to vote at any election
for the choice of electors for President and Vice-President of the United States,
Representatives in Congress, the Executive and Judicial Officers of a State, or
the members of the Legislature thereof, is denied to any of the male inhabitants of such State, being twenty-one years of age, and citizens of the United
States, or in any way abridged, except for participation in rebellion, or other
crime, the basis of representation therein shall be reduced in the proportion
which the number of such male citizens shall bear to the whole number of
male citizens twenty-one years of age in such State.

Sec. 3. [Disqualification to hold office.]
No person shall be a Senator or Representative in Congress, or Elector of
President and Vice President, or hold any office, civil or military, under the
United States, or under any State, who, having previously taken an oath, as a
member of Congress, or as an officer of the United States, or as a member of
any State legislature, or as an executive or judicial officer of any State, to
support the Constitution of the United States, shall have engaged in insurrection or rebellion against the same, or given aid or comfort to the enemies
thereof. But Congress may by a vote of two-thirds of each House, remove such
disability.

Sec. 4. (Public debt not to be questioned — Debts of the
Confederacy and claims not to be paid.]
The validity of the public debt of the United States, authorized by law,
including debts incurred for payment of pensions and bounties for services in
suppressing insurrection or rebellion, shall not be questioned. But neither the
United States nor any State shall assume or pay any debt or obligation incurred in aid of insurrection or rebellion against the United States, or any
claim for the loss or emancipation of any slave; but all such debts, obligations,
and claims shall be held Illegal and void.

Sec. 5. [Power to enforce amendment]
The Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the
provisions of this article.
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,

INSTRUCTIONS TO THE JURY

vs.

CRIMINAL NO. 961901704

MARK STEPHEN MERILA,
Defendant.

INSTRUCTION NO. 1
You are instructed that the defendant

HARK STEPHEN MERILA

is charged by the Information which has been duly filed with the
commission of

ABSCONDING .

The Information alleges:

ABSCONDING, a Third Degree Felony, at 6877 West 3170 South, in
Salt Lake County, State of Utah, on or about June 3, 1996, in
violation of Title 76, Chapter 8, Section 3 09.5, Utah Code
Annotated 1953, as amended, in that the defendant, MARK STEPHEN
MERILA, a party to the offense,did willfully change the residence
that he reported as his correct address, without notifying his
parole officer of obtaining permission.

INSTRUCTION NO.

2

Instruction No. 1 is not to be considered by you as a
statement of the facts proved in this case, but is to be regarded by you merely as a summarized statement of the allegations
of the Information.

The mere fact that the defendant stands

charged with an offense is not to be taken by you as any evidence of his guilt.

INSTRUCTION NO.

3

You are instructed that to the Information the defendant
has entered a plea of not guilty.

The plea of not guilty denies

each and all of the essential allegations of the charge contained
in the Information and casts upon the State the burden of proving
each and all of the essential allegations thereof to your satisfaction and beyond a reasonable doubt.

INSTRUCTION NO.

4

You are instructed that the mere fact that the defendant
has been charged with this offense and has been held to answer to
the charge by a committing magistrate, is not any evidence of his
guilt and is not even a circumstance which should be considered
by you in determining his guilt or innocence.

^ -A -"\ ^

INSTRUCTION NO.

C,

It becomes my duty as judge to instruct you concerning the
law applicable to this case, and it is your duty as jurors to
follow the law as I shall state it to you.
The function of the jury is to try the issues of fact that
are presented by the allegations in the Information filed in this
court and the defendant's plea of "not guilty11.

This duty you

should perform uninfluenced by pity for the defendant or by passion
or prejudice against him.

You must not suffer yourselves to be

biased against the defendant because of the fact that he has been
arrested for this offense, or because an Information has been filed
against him, or because he has been brought before the court to
stand trial. None of these facts is evidence of his guilt, and you
are not permitted to infer or to speculate from any or all of them
that he is more likely to be guilty than innocent.
You are to be governed solely by the evidence introduced in
this trial and the law as stated to you by me.

The law forbids

you to be governed by mere sentiment, conjecture, sympathy, passion,
prejudice, public opinion or public feeling.

Both the State of

Utah and the defendant have a right to demand and they do demand and
expect that you will conscientiously and dispassionately consider
and weigh the evidence and apply the law of the case, that you will
reach a just verdict regardless of what the consequences of such
verdict may be.
of each juror.

The verdict must express the individual opinion

INSTRUCTION NO.

&

At times throughout the trial the court has been called
upon to determine whether certain offered evidence might properly be admitted.

You are not to be concerned with the reasons

for such rulings and are not to draw any inferences from them.
Whether offered evidence is admissible is purely a question
of law.

In admitting evidence to which an objection is made,

the court does not determine what weight should be given such
evidence; nor does it pass on the credibility of the witness.
You are not to consider evidence offered but not admitted, nor
any evidence stricken out by the court; as to any question to
which an objection was sustained, you must not conjecture as to
what the answer might have been or as to the reason for the
objection.

INSTRUCTION NO,

^

All presumptions of law, independent of evidence, are in
favor of innocence, and a defendant is presumed innocent until he
is proved guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.

And in case of a

reasonable doubt as to whether his guilt is satisfactorily shown,
he is entitled to an acquittal.
I have heretofore told you that the burden is upon the State
to prove the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.

Proof

beyond a reasonable doubt does not require proof to an absolute
certainty.

Now by reasonable doubt is meant a doubt that is

based on reason and one which is reasonable in view of all the
evidence.

It must be a reasonable doubt and not a doubt which is

merely fanciful or imaginary or based on a wholly speculative
possibility.

Proof beyond a reasonable doubt is that degree of

proof which satisfies the mind, convinces the understanding of
those who are bound to act conscientiously upon it and obviates
all reasonable

doubt.

A reasonable doubt

is a doubt which

reasonable men and women would entertain, and it roust arise from
the evidence or the lack of the evidence in this case.

INSTRUCTION NO.

\

Where there is a conflict in the evidence you should
reconcile such conflict as far as you reasonably can.

But

where the conflict cannot be reconciled, you are the final
judges and must determine from the evidence what the facts
are.

There are no definite rules governing how you shall

determine the weight or convincing force of any evidence, or
how you shall determine what the facts in this case are.

But

you should carefully and conscientiously consider and compare
all of the testimony, and all of the facts and circumstances,
which have a bearing on any issue, and determine therefrom
what the facts are.

You are not bound to believe all that

the witnesses have testified to or any witness or class of
witnesses unless such testimony is reasonable and convincing
in view of all of the facts and circumstances in evidence.
You may believe one witness as against many, or many as against
a fewer number in accordance with your honest convictions.

The

testimony of a witness known to have made false statements on
one matter is naturally less convincing on other matters.

So

if you believe a witness has wilfully testified falsely as to
any material fact in this case, you may disregard the whole of
the testimony of such witness, or you may give it such weight
as you think it is entitled to.

INSTRUCTION NO.

^

You are the exclusive judges of the credibility of the
witnesses and the weight of the evidence.

In judging the weight

of the testimony and credibility of the witnesses you have a
right to take into consideration their bias, their interest in
the result of the suit, or any probable motive or lack thereof
to testify fairly, if any is shown. You may consider the witnesses1 deportment upon the witness stand, the reasonableness of
their statements, their apparent frankness or candor, or the want
of it, their opportunity to know, their ability to understand,
and their capacity to remember.

You should consider these matters

together with all of the other facts and circumstances which you
may believe have a bearing on the truthfulness or accuracy of the
witnessesf statement.

INSTRUCTION NO.

(V

You are instructed that the defendant is a competent
witness in his own behalf and has the right to go upon the
witness stand and testify if he chooses to do so. However,
the law expressly provides that no presumption adverse to him
is to arise from the mere fact that he does not place himself
upon the witness stand.

If he is satisfied with the evidence

which has been given, there is no occasion for him to add
thereto.
So, in this case the mere fact that this defendant has
not availed himself of the privilege which the law gives him
should not prejudice him in any way.

It should not be considere

as any indication either of his guilt or of his innocence. The
failure of the defendant to testify is not even a circumstance
against him and no presumption of guilt can be indulged in the
minds of the jury by reason of such failure on his part.

INSTRUCTION NO.

(1

In arriving at a verdict in this case, you shall not discuss nor consider the subject of
penalty or punishment. The Court and other governmental agencies are responsible for deciding
those issue. Accordingly, the subject of penalty or punishment must not in any way affect your
decision as to the innocence or guilt of the defendant.

INSTRUCTION NO.

d

Under the law of the State of Utah, no person is guilty of an offense unless his conduct is
prohibited by law and he acts intentionally or knowingly with respect to each element of the
offense.
One acts "intentionally" when it is his conscious objective or desire to engage in the
conduct or cause a result.
The intent with which an act is done denotes a state of mind and connotes purpose in so
acting. Intent, being a state of mind, is not always susceptible of proof by direct and positive
evidence, and must ordinarily be inferred from acts, conduct, statements, or circumstances.
One acts "knowingly" when he is aware of the nature of his conduct or the existing
circumstances that his conduct is reasonably certain to cause the result.

INSTRUCTION NO.

Yh

Before you can convict the defendant, MARK STEPHEN MERILA, of the crime of
Absconding you must find from the evidence, beyond a reasonable doubt, all of the following
elements of that crime:
1.

That on or about June 3, 1996, in Salt Lake County, Utah, the defendant, MARK

STEPHEN MERILA was an offender under parole supervision.
2.

That the defendant did change his residence, that he had reported as his correct

residence, without notifying his parole officer fe obtaining permission^
3.

That the defendant acted willfully or intentionally.

If you believe that the evidence establishes each and all of the essential elements of the
offense beyond a reasonable doubt, it is your duty to convict the defendant. On the other hand, if
the evidence has failed to so establish one or more of said elements then you should find the
defendant not guilty.

INSTRUCTION NO.

)*/

Your are instructed that a person engages in conduct intentionally or willfully with
respect to the nature of his conduct or to a result of his conduct, when it is his conscious
objective or desire to engage in the conduct or cause the result.

INSTRUCTION NO.

W

An offender absconds from supervision when he willfully changes the residence that he
reported as his correct address without notifying his parole officer or obtaining permission.

INSTRUCTION NO.

JSt

"Residence" is defined as the factual place of abode or living
in a particular locality. Residence simply indicates a person's
actual place of abode, whether permanent or temporary and is
accompanied with the intention to remain,,

INSTRUCTION NO. \Lf
An offender means a person who has been convicted a crime and has been placed on
parole under condition that he report to a parole officer on a regular basis.

INSTRUCTION NO.

\H

In determining any fact in this case you should not
consider nor be influenced by any statement made or act done
by the court which you may interpret as indicating its views
thereon.

You are the sole and final judges of all questions

of fact submitted to you, and you must determine such questions
for yourselves from the evidence, without regard to what you
believe the court thinks thereon.

The court has not intended

to express, or intimate, or be understood as giving any opinion on what the proof shows or does not show, or what are or
what are not the facts in the case. And it is immaterial what
the court thinks thereon.

You must follow your own views and

not be influenced by the views of the court.

INSTRUCTION NO.

\:

\ j

The State of Utah and the defendant both are entitled
to the individual opinion of each juror.

It is the duty of

each of you after considering all the evidence in the case, to
determine, if possible, the question of guilt or innocence of
the defendant.

When you have reached a conclusion in that re-

spect, you should not change it merely because one or more or
all of your fellow jurors may have come to a different conclusion.

However, each juror should freely and fairly discuss

with his fellow jurors the evidence and the deduction to be
drawn therefrom.

If, after doing so, any juror should be sat-

isfied that a conclusion first reached by him was wrong, he
unhesitatingly should abandon that original opinion and render
his verdict according to his final decision.

INSTRUCTION NO,

\ C\

If in these instructions any rule, direction or idea
has been stated in varying ways, no emphasis thereon is intended, and none must be inferred by you.

For that reason,

you are not to single out any certain sentence, or any individual
point or instruction, and ignore the others, but you are to consider all the instructions as a whole, and to regard each in the
light of all the others.
The order in which the instructions are given has no
significance as to their relative importance.

INSTRUCTION NO.

^0

The attitude and conduct of jurors at the outset of
their deliberations are a matter of considerable importance.
It is rarely productive of good for a juror, upon entering
the jury room, to make an emphatic expression of his opinion
on the case or to announce a determination to stand for a
certain verdict. When one does that at the outset, his sense
of pride may be aroused, and he may hesitate to recede from
an announced position if shown that it is fallacious.

Remember

that you are not partisans or advocates in this matter, but are
judges.

The final test of the quality of your service will lie

in the verdict which you return to the court, not in the opinions any of you may hold as you retire. Have in mind that you
will make a definite contribution to efficient judicial administration if you arrive at a just and proper verdict.

To that

end, the court would remind you that in your deliberations in
the jury room there can be no triumph excepting the ascertainment
and declaration of the truth and the administation of justice
based thereon.

INSTRUCTION NO.

QA

The court has endeavored to give you instructions embodying all rules of law that may become necessary in guiding
you to a just and lawful verdict.

The applicability of some of

these instructions will depend upon the conclusions you reach
as to what the facts are.

As to any such instruction, the

fact that it has been given must not be taken as indicating an
opinion of the court and that the instruction will be necessary
or as to what the facts are.

If an instruction applies only to

a state of facts which you find does not exist, you will disregard the instruction.

INSTRUCTION NO.

^ ^

Two classes of evidence are recognized and admitted in
courts of justice, upon either or both of which, juries lawfully may base their findings, whether favorable to the State
or to the defendant, provided, however, that to support a verdict of guilt the evidence, whether of one kind or the other
or a combination of both, must carry the convincing quality required by law.
One type of evidence is known as direct and the other
as circumstantial.

The law makes no distinction between the two

classes as to the degree of proof required for conviction or as
to their effectiveness in defendant's favor, but respects each
for such convincing force as it may carry and accepts each as a
reasonable method of proof.
Direct evidence of a person's conduct at any time in
question consists of the testimony of every witness who, with
any of his own physical senses, perceived such conduct or any
part thereof, and which testimony describes or relates what
thus was perceived.

All other evidence admitted in the trial is

circumstantial in relation to such conduct, and, insofar as it
shows any act, statement or other conduct, or any circumstance
of fact, tending to prove by reasonable inference the innocence
or guilt of the defendant, it may be considered by you in arriving at a verdict.

INSTRUCTION NO

. 33

When you retire to consider your verdict, you will select one
of your members to act as foreperson, who, as foreperson, will
preside over your deliberations.
Your verdict in this case must be either:
Guilty of ABSCONDING, a Third Degree Felony, as charged in the
Information;
or
Not Guilty;
as your deliberations may determine.
This being a criminal case, a unanimous concurrence of all
jurors is required to find a verdict.
writing, and

when

Your verdict must be in

found, must be signed

and

dated

foreperson and then returned by you to this court.

by your
When your

verdict has been found, notify the bailiff that you are ready to
report to the court.

\/j/fi
Dated at Salt Lake City, Utah
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